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PREFACE
This paper is one of several by the author to help government wetland and floodplain managers
understand their potential legal liability for failing to consider climate change in their programs
or for incorporating strengthened flood loss reduction standards reflecting climate change in their
zoning, building codes, subdivision and other regulations.
This paper more specifically addresses the following legal issues:
1. Could wetland and floodplain managers be liable for failing to consider climate change in their
policies where such failure increases flood damages to other properties (e.g., accelerated loss of
beaches and dunes, erosion, over-topping of levees, breaching of dams, loss of wetland
protection and restoration areas which provide flood storage, etc.)? If so, under what legal
theories and under what circumstances?
2. Are governments potentially liable for tightly regulating development in flood hazard areas
with flooding caused by or worsened by climate change? Would such regulations “take” private
property without payment of just compensation?
3. If governments are potentially liable in either situation, how can they reduce potential
liability?
The paper draws upon papers and webinars by the author and others:
Jon Kusler, Esq. and Virginia Burkett (1999), Climate Change in Wetland Areas, Part I: Potential
Wetland Impacts and Interactions, Association of State Wetland Managers, and the National
Wetlands Research Center (USGS).
Jon Kusler, Esq. and Virginia Burkett (1999), Climate Change in Wetland Areas, Part II: Carbon
Cycle Implications, Association of State Wetland Managers and the National Wetlands Research
Center, USGS (1999).
Jon Kusler, Esq. and Virginia Burkett (1999). Wetlands and Climate Change - Scientific
Approaches and Management Options, National Wetlands Research Center, USGS,
Environmental Law Institute, Volume 21, Number 2 (March-April 1999).
A portion of the material contained in the paper which follows was developed by the author as
part of a larger book: Jon Kusler, Government Liability for Flood Hazards (2016)
For other books, papers, and reports addressing government liability for failing to take into
account climate change see Jennifer Klein, (2015) Potential Liability of Governments for Failure
to Prepare for Climate Change, Columbia Law School; Willis Hon (2013) 5th Circuit Reverses
Itself on Hurricane Katrina Liability Lawsuit
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For an excellent and comprehensive list and analysis of court cases addressing climate change
litigation see the Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change website.
http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/climate-change-laws-world
See also an excellent recent book: Michael Gerrard (ed.,), (2016) Global Climate Change and
U.S. Law, American Bar Association
For other papers concerning government liability for increasing flooding prepared by the author
or by the author and the Association of State Floodplain Managers and The Association of State
Wetland Managers see Jon Kusler, Esq. and Ed Thomas, Esq., NAI and the Courts: Protecting
the Property Rights of All Updated (2008); Jon Kusler, Esq., A Comparative Look at Public
Liability for Flood Hazard Mitigation (2009); Jon Kusler., Esq., Professional Liability for
Construction in Flood Hazard Areas (2007). Jon Kusler & Sam Riley Medlock, Flood Risk in the
Courts: Reducing Government Liability While Encouraging Government Responsibility (2012).
These are available as “legal papers” on the Association of State Floodplain Managers web site:
http://www.floods.org/index.asp?menuID=301&firstlevelmenuID=188&siteID=1.
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SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS
There is broad scientific consensus that climate change is occurring. Most scientists agree that
this change will, in some instances, cause substantial increases in sea level, ground water levels
and the levels of inland lakes, rivers and streams and other inland water bodies. They broadly
agree that this will increase not only the depth of flooding on both public and private lands but
also the duration of flooding and associated erosion. Governments may increase flood damages
by failing to anticipate climate change (e.g., failing to elevate houses) in their programs and
policies.
No court has yet held a governmental unit liable for damages for failure to reflect climate change
in its programs or policies with resulting increased flood damages. However courts have widely
held governments liable in cases involving more traditional flooding and erosion for increasing
flood damages on upstream, downstream or adjacent lands. And, successful suits with climatechange elements or based primarily on climate change where flooding and damages caused by
government actions or inactions are increased or would not ordinarily occur may be expected in
the coming years. This is particularly true where scientific studies quantify climate change and
increases in the frequency and intensity of flooding and where flooding and flood damages due
to climate change are combined with flooding from more traditional flooding and erosion.
To reduce flood damages from climate change, governments can strengthen their floodplain
regulations including revised floodplain maps, increased flood proofing elevations, and
broadened floodways and coastal high velocity zones. However, some of these regulations will
likely be challenged by private landowners as a taking of private property without payment of
just compensation. Based upon the broad support courts to date have given to more traditional
floodplain regulations and the growing scientific consensus concerning climate change, courts
are likely to uphold such climate-change related regulations.
Looking to the future, climate-related natural hazards will be increasingly quantified, foreseeable
and predictable with improved computer models and global and regional monitoring. As this
occurs, governments may be held liable for flooding in areas which have not previously flooded
and/or for exacerbating existing flood problems. Governments need to be particularly careful
with their policies for areas behind dikes, dams, and levees where catastrophic losses may occur
if design frequencies are exceeded and the legal doctrine of “strict liability” may apply.
All levels of government may be sued under common law “tort” or Constitution theories for
causing or exacerbating climate-related flood problems but local governments are particularly
vulnerable as they design and operate storm water systems and undertake other activities
(construction of dams, levees, fills, ditches, culverts, highway construction) where they may
increase flooding and erosion on some private lands while reducing it on others. Their failure to
take climate change into account may be considered by a court to be “unreasonable” and
“negligent” conduct, particularly where there is a high concentration of risk factors.
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To reduce potential liability based upon claims of negligence (“unreasonable” conduct) or other
legal theories (“nuisance”, “trespass”, “taking”, etc.) governments should reflect climate change
in their policies and programs and take measures to address climate change of the sort suggested
in the text below and Box 1. These actions would not only reduce the potential for successful
climate change-related suits but also the potential for litigation based on more traditional types of
flooding and erosion. They could do so with confidence that courts will uphold floodplain
regulations reflecting climate change although courts in a small number of cases have held more
traditional floodplain regulations which deny all economic use of land a taking of private
property without payment of just compensation. Governments can take a variety of measures
suggested below to reduce the potential for courts to hold that tight regulations adopted to reduce
climate change-related flooding and flood damages are a taking.
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INCREASES IN FLOOD DAMAGES DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Increasing Flood Hazards
On September 27, 2013 The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a summary
of it’s fifth assessment report on climate change 1. The summary concludes that
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950’s, many of the
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.
….
Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is evident from the increasing
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, positive radiation forcing, observed
warming, and understanding of the climate system.
….
It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed
warming since the mid-20th century. There is a 95% probability that human action is the
dominant cause of climate change. This represents an increase in certainty from 90% in
the previous report.
….
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all
components of the climate system.
This summary report predicts that there will be a probable temperature rise by 2100 of 1.4 to 4
degrees C, increases in heat waves are very likely to occur more frequently and last longer, and
sea level rise will very likely occur faster than between 1971 and 2010. Recent predictions have
increased these estimates due, in part, to the melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. See
http://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/west-antarctic-ice-sheets-collapse-triggers-sealevel-warning-n103221
The IPCC predicts that climate change will result in a rise in sea level between 0.6 and 2 feet
(0.18 to 0.59 meters) by the end of this century. 2 Other estimates are much higher. 3 There has

1

The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Fifth Assessment Report On Climate Change released in part
on September 27, 2013.
2
See IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability . Contribution of Working Group II
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Parry, Martin L., Canziani,
Osvaldo F., Palutikof, Jean P., van der Linden, Paul J., and Hanson, Clair E. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1000 pp.
3
See footnotes 1 and 2 above. See also Pilkey, Orrin and Keith Pilkey, Global Climate Change: A Primer (2011);
Pilkey, Orrin and Rob Young The Rising Sea (2009. Orrin Pilkey has written in an article originally published in
News and Observer (Durham) which states that:
Western Carolina University’s Rob Young and I have argued that seas will rise at least 3 feet in this century
and that, for coastal management purposes, a rise of 7 feet (2 meters) should be utilized for planning major
infrastructure. While some question our recommendation, consider that:
• A blue ribbon panel of scientists from Miami, the U.S. city considered most vulnerable to sea level
rise (in terms of property damage) , predicted that the sea will rise a minimum of 3 to 5 feet by
2100.
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already been an increase in the number of severe precipitation events over many areas. A United
Nations report suggests that by the end of the century severe heat events will increase by a factor
of ten. 4 The IPCC has predicted that higher temperatures are expected to raise sea level by
expanding ocean water, melting mountain glaciers and small ice caps, and causing portions of
Greenland and the Antarctic ice sheets to melt. Increasing temperatures tend to increase
evaporation which leads to more precipitation. As average global temperatures have risen,
average global precipitation has also increased. According to the IPCC 5, there has been an
increase in the number of severe precipitation events over many areas during the past century, as
well as an increase since the 1970s in the prevalence of droughts, especially in the tropics and
subtropics. More specifically, the IPCC Chapter 1 concludes that: “It is likely that the frequency
of heavy precipitation will increase in the 21st century over many areas of the globe.” It further
concludes that “(T)he risk of severe harm and loss due to climate change-related hazards and
various vulnerabilities is particularly high in low-lying coastal zones.” Ibid.
Climate change will likely cause flooding in locations where no flooding has occurred before.
For example, storm surge and wave inundation may occur in areas newly subject to sea level
rise. In other circumstances, climate change will exacerbate flooding, erosion, landslides, and
other natural hazards that are already occurring. As a contributing factor, it will also add to the
areal extent, depth, and velocity of flooding.
Climate change will cause some inland areas of the U.S. such as the Southwest to become drier
while other areas such as the Southeast will become wetter. 6 Seasonal changes in precipitation
are also expected such as increased winter rain and runoff in the mountains of the West and
summer rain and runoff in the same areas. The frequency and intensity of hurricanes and coastal
storms will likely also increase.
A study reported in the February 17, 2011 issue of Nature 7 magazine found that heavy
precipitation in recent years is due at least in part to the increase of manmade greenhouse gases
•
•
•
•

A similar panel of scientists in Rhode Island predicts a minimal 3 to 5 foot rise for that state.
A Washington State report assumes a sea level rise along the shores of Puget Sound of a bit more
than 4 feet.
A report to the state of California assumes a 4 foot rise along the California coast.
The Dutch, who take sea level rise more seriously than anyone, assume for the purposes of design
of dikes and storm gates that sea level will rise 2.5 feet by 2050.

See also IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, Section C. Current Knowledge About Future Impacts – Magnitudes of
Impact in IPCC AR4 WG2 2007 provides that “ Partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet, and possibly the
West Antarctic ice sheet, could contribute 4 to 6 m (13 to 20 ft) or more to sea level rise.”
4
See IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Summary
for Policy Makers. IPCC 2011. The report concluded that: “Based upon AIB and A2 emission scenarios, a 1-20 year
hottest day is likely to become a 1-2 year event by the end of the 21st Century in most regions….”
5
See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/recentpsc.html.
6
NOAA's National Climatic Data Center has compiled precipitation data which show that over the contiguous U.S.,
total annual precipitation have increased at an average rate of 6.1 percent per century since 1900, although there was
considerable regional variability. The greatest increases came in the East North Central climate region (11.6 percent
per century) and the South (11.1 percent). Hawaii was the only region to show a decrease (-9.25 percent).
7
See Min, S.K et Al. Nature 470, 378-381 (2011).
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in the atmosphere. In this study, a team of scientists from Scotland and Canada used computers
to analyze the causes behind the rise in storms and heavy snowfall over the past fifty years. They
found that the likelihood of extreme precipitation on any given day rose by 7% between 1951
and 1999—the years addressed by the study. This increase exceeds the bounds of normal
variability. This increase is explained if greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are taken
into account. Climatologists have predicted an increase in extreme weather events as greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere increase. Warmer air can carry more water vapor and a
warmer planet should therefore see heavier rain and other precipitation. Another article in Nature
suggests that for every 1 C in warming, scientists expect a 2-3% increase in total global
precipitation. 8
In the same issue of Nature the results of a study of the severe rains that flooded England and
Wales in 2000 was published. 9 Researchers looked at the climate as it existed in 2000 in
comparison with hypothetical climates as they would have existed if human beings had not
added greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The article concluded that the chances of a major
flood happening at that time were roughly doubled by the rise in greenhouse gases.
The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a landmark case, Massachusetts v. EPA, 10 that EPA had the
statutory authority and responsibility to regulate greenhouse gases which are causing or
contributing to climate change. The Court recognized in a factually-specific decision the
following harms associated with climate change 11:
The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized. Indeed, the
NRC Report itself — which EPA regards as an "objective and independent assessment of
the relevant science," 68 Fed. Reg. 52930 — identifies a number of environmental
changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including "the global retreat of
mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of ice on
rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century
relative to the past few thousand years. . . ." NRC Report 16.
Petitioners allege that this only hints at the environmental damage yet to come.
According to the climate scientist Michael MacCracken, "qualified scientific experts
involved in climate change research" have reached a "strong consensus" that global
warming threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the
century, MacCracken Decl. ¶ 5, Stdg. App. 207, "severe and irreversible changes to
natural ecosystems," id., ¶ 5(d), at 209, a "significant reduction in water storage in winter
snowpack in mountainous regions with direct and important economic consequences,"
ibid., and an increase in the spread of disease, id., ¶ 28, at 218-219. He also observes that
rising ocean temperatures may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes. Id., ¶¶ 23-25, at
216-217.[fn18]

8

Allen, R. et.al. Nature, 470 , 344-345 (2011).
Pall, P. et. al Nature, 470, 382-385 (2011).
10
549 U.S. 497 (S. Ct., 2007).
11
549 U.S. 497, 521 ( S. Ct., 2007).
9
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With increased hazards, and continued and intensified occupation of floodplains will come
additional flooding and flood damages to private and public property. This will likely result in
law suits based upon a variety of legal theories discussed below. To reduce climate-related flood
hazards it is also likely that an increasing number of states and local governments will adopt or
revise their floodplain regulations to reflect climate change such as revised flood maps,
regulatory flood elevations, and freeboard requirements, as well as increased floodways and
velocity zones. However, some floodplain and wetland landowners will likely challenge
regulations as a taking of private property without payment of just compensation.
Government Inaction
Despite the prospect of worsening flooding and erosion problems due to climate change, only a
small portion of the governmental units in the United States are, apparently, reflecting climate
change in their policies and activities. For example, few are revising their flood inundation maps
or establishing new flood protection elevations. Such omissions could result in increased
flooding and flood damages due to the inadequate flood proofing elevations, inadequate design,
construction, and maintenance of flood control structures (e.g., dikes, dams, levees, groins, sea
walls); inadequate design and construction of highways (e.g., bridge apertures and culverts);
inadequate management of public lands (e.g., flash flooding where campers may be using public
lands); and in a variety of other contexts. The likelihood of successful suits increases as the
scientific support for human-induced climate change and resulting flood losses increases and the
climate-related risks are quantified. See discussion below.
Apart from climate change-related flooding and erosion, courts are increasingly holding
governments liable for flood damages caused by more traditional flooding under common law
(e.g., nuisance, negligence) theories and, to a lesser extent, under Constitutional legal theories
(e.g., “inverse condemnation”). These suits will likely continue but with the addition of climate
change as one causative or contributing factor to the increased flooding and erosion. Over time,
climate change will likely become an increasingly important risk factor.
Taking climate change into account in establishing flood loss protection standards will require
partially changed flood assessment methods. Floodplain regulatory and management agencies
have, to a considerable extent, based their flood calculations on historic flood and rainfall data.
Taking climate change into account will require new assumptions and more reliance on model
projections than historical records. Because flood hazard management agencies have difficulty in
accurately predicting the magnitude and location of climate changes does not mean that they
cannot predict “probabilities” and “ranges” of likely increases. And, there may be a variety of
“low risk” options for simultaneously addressing climate change and achieving other objectives
such as providing urban greenways and recreation areas as well as reducing flood losses in a
particular circumstance.
Government liability for failing to take into account flood damages may be based upon the
common law tort theories briefly discussed below such as negligence (i.e. “unreasonable
conduct”), public and private nuisance, strict liability, trespass, negligence, denial of lateral
support, and violation of riparian rights. Such suits may also be based, in some circumstances,
upon claims of government taking of private property without payment of just compensation.
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Measures which governmental units could take to reduce potential liability for flood and erosion
damages caused or exacerbated by climate change are discussed in the summary and
recommendations above, concluding remarks, and Box 1 below. These measures will also reduce
more traditional flood and erosion-related flood damages and flood-related litigation.
Contexts in Which Individuals Damaged By Flooding May Sue Governments if
Governments Fail to Consider Climate Change in Their Programs and Policies
Floods continue to cause severe damages in the U.S. and abroad despite efforts to reduce such
losses through flood control works, adoption of regulations, and other measures. A
comparatively small flood in Colorado in 2013 caused more than 3 billion dollars in damages.
The "Great Flood" along the Mississippi in 1993 and its tributaries caused damages estimated at
15-20 billion dollars. 12 Hurricane Katrina in 2005 killed more than 900 13 and caused damages
which have been estimated to approach $200 billion dollars. 14 According to NOAA losses from
Super Storm Sandy in 2012 cost 67 billion dollars making it the 2nd costliest storm in US history.
When flood plain landowners are damaged by flooding or erosion they quite often sue
governments in more traditional flooding or erosion contexts based upon common law or
Constitutional legal theories claiming that the governments increased flooding and flood
damages to their properties. Landowners may also question the reasonableness and adequacy of
the design, operation, and maintenance of dikes, dams, levees, drainage channels, and culverts
and other flood loss reduction measures.
Successful common law (tort) liability suits based upon traditional flooding and erosion have
become increasingly expensive to governments. For example, in 2003 the California Court of
Appeals upheld a damage award against the State of California for flood damages. See Paterno
vs. State of California. 15 The settlement total in this suit was $464 million dollars. Much larger
amounts of money are at stake in the law suits filed by private landowners and local governments
in Louisiana and the neighboring states of Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi after Hurricane
Katrina struck the Gulf on August 29, 2005. Suits had been filed on behalf of approximately
250,000 people seeking over $278 billion in damages from the federal government alone. 16

12

See http://mo.water.usgs.gov/Reports/1993-Flood/
See http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11281267/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back
14
See http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3026/2006-3026.pdf
15
113 Cal.App.4th 998 (Calif., 2003).
16
See generally, Houck, O. “The Three Katrinas: Hard Cases Make New Law, National Wetland Newsletter, JulyAugust, 2010; Brougher, C & K. Alexander, CRS Report to Congress, Federal Liability for Hurricane KatrinaRelated Flood Damage, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. (2008); Thomas, E., 2007, Recovery
Following Hurricane Katrina: Will Litigation and Uncertainty Today Make for an Improved Tomorrow? Vol 29, no.
5, National Wetlands Newsletter, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.; Brougher, C., Flood Damage
Related to Army Corps of Engineers Projects: Selected Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service (June 7,
2011). In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 05-4182 Section C.A.No.05-4182.
13
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Courts have already held governments liable in many situations under common law and
Constitutional legal theories (e.g., “taking without payment of just compensation”) for causing or
exacerbating flood or drainage problems. These suits will likely continue but with the addition,
over time, of climate change as one causative factor for flooding and erosion losses.
Some more specific contexts in which landowners damaged by climate change-related flooding
or erosion may sue governments for such flood damages include:
--Increased flood and erosion damages resulting from government issuance of
building permits for development in coastal and inland climate-related flood areas.
Landowners may sue governments for issuing permits (building codes, zoning, subdivision
controls) which fail to consider increased flood hazards due to climate change.
For examples of cases holding governments liable for issuing building permits or other permits
which increased flood damages on their properties in more traditional flooding contexts see, e.g.,
Hurst v. U.S., 17 in which a federal district court held the Corps of Engineers liable for issuing a
Section 404 permit for construction of jetties in the White River. The jetties were not
constructed as called for in the permit and blocked flows in the river. As a result, a landowner
was seriously flooded. The Corps knew that Hurst was violating the permit issued to him and the
Corps violated its own regulations by failing to issue an order prohibiting any further work by
Hurst on the project despite many requests by the landowner who was damaged. The district
court initially held that the landowner could not sue the Corps pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act. On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for
findings on the claim that the Corps caused Hurst’s damages by negligently failing to issue a
prohibitory order. See Hurst v. United States. 18 On remand to the district court, the court of
appeals observed that “the Corps’ regulations governing issuance of permits for projects in
navigable waterways also indicates that the Corps should be concerned with minimizing the risks
of flooding on surrounding property.” 19 The court found that 20:
Because the Hursts were included in the class of persons meant to be offered some
protection from flooding under the federal regulations governing the Corps, the Corps’
failure to enforce its own regulations amounts to negligence per se under South Dakota
law.
For other cases holding governmental units liable for issuing permits or approving subdivisions
which increase flooding on other property see, for example, the following: Eschete v. City of
New Orleans 21 (City could be held liable for approving subdivision which overtaxed drainage
system and caused flooding.); City of Keller v. Wilson 22 (City was liable for approving
subdivisions based upon city’s drainage plan but then failing to acquire 2.8 acres to implement
17

739 F. Supp. 1377 (D., 1990).
882 F.2d 306 (8th Cir., 1989).
19
Id. at 1380.
20
Id. at 1381, 1382.
21
245 So.2d 383 (La., 1971).
22
86 S.W.3d 693 (Tex., 2002).
18
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the plan. This case was partially reversed and remanded by City of Keller v. Wilson 23); Harris
Cty. F. Con. V. Adam; 24 (Harris County Flood Control District was potentially liable for
approval of a highway project (Beltway 8) which flooded private property.); Kite v. City of
Westworth Village 25 (A “taking” without payment of just compensation potentially occurred
where city approved a plat resulting in a diversion of water from its natural course and resulting
damage.); Pennebaker v. Parish of Jefferson 26, (Parish could be held liable for increased
flooding by allowing street improvements, building construction and street drainage without
taking steps to prevent flooding.); Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles, 27 (County was liable when
it approved subdivision and accepted dedication of road facilities which resulted in flood and
erosion damages.); Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 28 (City was liable in inverse condemnation for
having approved subdivisions and accepted drainage easements and having diverted increased
waters onto private property.); Yue v. City of Auburn, 29 (City was potentially liable for
approving subdivision which increased impervious surfaces without upgrading downstream
stormwater facilities to convey increased flows.).
--Deaths and injuries due to flash flooding on public lands. Flash floods will likely
occur more frequently in some areas of the U.S. as the intensity and perhaps the frequency of
thunderstorms, hurricanes, and coastal storms increases. Members of the public may be injured
or killed while utilizing public lands 30 for hiking, camping, and other recreation. They may sue
public land managers for failing to provide adequate flood warnings and for failing to develop
adequate hazard mitigation plans. Governments may be liable, like other landowners, in
situations where the public or private employees are injured by natural hazards while using
public lands such as public forests, parks, wilderness areas, recreation areas, lakes, streams,
ocean waters, beaches, reservoirs, wetlands, and other waters or water-related lands.
Governments may also be liable for natural hazard injuries to the public or government
employees in public buildings such as post offices, museums, schools, courthouses, libraries,
campgrounds, marinas, publicly owned housing, industrial parks, or other publicly owned or
leased properties. In addition, governments may be liable to others for renting, leasing or selling
lands subject to natural hazards. Liability for failing to anticipate flash flooding to date has been
based primarily upon the theory of negligence.
For examples of cases holding the federal government liable for flood-related deaths from flash
flooding on public lands see, e.g., Coates v. United States. 31 In this case three campers were
killed at Aspenglen Campround in Rocky Mountain National Park when Lawn Lake dam burst
on July 15, 1982. The National Park Service attempted to warn campers of the impending flood.

23

168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex., 2005); City Keller v. Wilson, 2-00-183-CV (Tex., App. 2007).
56 S.W.3d 665 (Tex., 2001).
25
853 S.W.2d 200 (Tex., 1993).
26
383 So.2d 484 (La., 1980).
27
84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal., 1970).
28
28 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal., 1963).
29
4 Cal. Rptr.2d 653 (Cal., 1992).
30
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But, the three failed to respond and were killed by the rapidly rising waters. The heirs of the
three sued the National Park Service claiming inadequate warnings and negligence. A federal
district court held the National Park Service liable for not providing adequate warnings. The
court also held that the Service had failed to develop an adequate plan for warning and
evacuating people in the Park “in the event a crisis arose.” See also Ducey v. United States, 32
(Park Service possibly liable for failing to warn of or guard against flash flooding.).
--Permanent flood and erosion damages caused by coastal sea level rise. Rising sea
levels combined with increased hurricanes and coastal storms will likely increase the depth and
velocity of flooding on a more or less permanent basis in some contexts and the severity of
flooding and erosion in other contexts with resulting increased damage to coastal structures and
infrastructure. Landowners could sue governments arguing that governments have acted
unreasonably in issuing permits and for failing to address climate change in the design of groins
and seawalls and other coastal flood protection measures. Growing scientific agreement
concerning the magnitude of sea level rise due to climate change and identification of areas
which will be inundated will help provide the factual basis for such suits. Several organizations
such as the U.S. Geological Survey in cooperation with NOAA and other state and federal
agencies are now preparing such maps.
In addition to these contexts in which landowners may sue communities and states for increasing
flood and/or erosion damages, landowners may also challenge tightened floodplain regulations as
an unconstitutional “taking” of private property without payment of just compensation. See
discussion below. Strengthened hazard regulations may take the form of zoning regulations,
subdivision controls, building codes, sanitary codes, and other special codes adopted at state, or
(primarily) local levels. See discussion below pertaining to the Constitutionality of floodplain
regulations reflecting climate change and related flood and erosion issues.

LITIGATION THEORIES
Landowners may sue governments for failing to consider climate change in their programs and
policies pursuant to a number of statutes offering nonmonetary remedies such as the Endangered
Species Act (see Appendix B). Private landowners damaged by flooding may also file law suits
for damages claiming that governments have increased climate-related flooding and flood
damages based upon a number of other legal theories including but not limited to those described
below. 33 This list is not exhaustive. For example, there is no discussion of “fraud” because fraud
is discussed at some length in a law review article by Jennifer Klein, “Potential Liability of
Governments for Failure to Prepare for Climate Change”, Columbia Law School (2013). For
more information the reader is referred to this article.
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“Private” and “Public” Nuisances
In some circumstances, governments may be sued based upon common law nuisance if they
increase flood or erosion hazards on other lands by activities on their own lands. Nuisances may
be either ‘private” or “public”. With either type, at common law, no landowner has a right to use
his or her land in a manner that substantially interferes, in a physical sense, with the use and
enjoyment of other lands. See, e.g., Sandifer Motor, Inc. v. City of Rodland Park 34 (Flooding due
to city dumping debris into ravine which blocked sewer system was a nuisance.) Public or
private nuisance pertains to interference with right to use of land and is therefore more restricted
than “negligence”. It is the unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use of one's property in a
manner that substantially interferes with the enjoyment or use of another individual's property,
without an actual trespass or physical invasion of the land. "Reasonable" conduct is usually no
defense against a nuisance suit although reasonableness may affect the type of relief available.
For a discussion of the federal common law of nuisance as applied to climate change see
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, Inc., 35 above.
Examples of government activities which may increase natural hazards in climate change
contexts and may be subject to public or private nuisance suits include but are not limited to the
construction, operation, and maintenance of channelization works, dikes, dams, levees, culverts,
bridges, highways, groins, and sea walls.
“Public” Nuisances
One category of nuisance cases involve claims by a variety of parties that government polluters
have made meaningful contributions to atmospheric gases and the resulting changes in climate
constitute a “ public” nuisance 36 under state and/or federal common law. A public nuisance
represents an "unreasonable" interference with a public right, and “an active - or, at least, an
imminent threat of injury”. 37 Public nuisance is a broad and amorphous legal theory. Courts to
date have provided some dicta support for climate-related public nuisance suits although there
have been no successful judgments. See for example, Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA38 (5th Cir.,
2009) in which the plaintiffs alleged that Comer and other defendants producing fossil fuels
released greenhouse gases that contributed to climate change which, in turn, added to the ferocity
of Hurricane Katrina causing damages to plaintiff’s property. The suit was brought under the
legal theories of public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. This suit survived preliminary legal challenges but was
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dismissed because one of the judges “recused” himself (disqualify or remove oneself as a judge
over a particular proceeding) and the court, therefore, lacked a quorum.
Courts in other climate-related cases have rejected public nuisance arguments. For example, a
federal district court in Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation 39 dismissed a
public nuisance law suit by the native village of Kivalina against utility, oil, and energy
companies claiming that Exxon’s emissions contributed to global warming which caused melting
of Arctic sea ice which, in turn, flooded the native village. In Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Company, Inc., 40 eight states, the City of New York and a number of private land trusts
sued as a public nuisance utility companies for causing global warming and a variety of
damages. The 2nd Circuit court of appeals held that the state and land trusts had “standing” to
sue. The court held that the plaintiffs could bring suit under a claim of “the federal common law
of nuisance.” It also held that the case could not be dismissed on the ground of a political
question doctrine. The court 41 held that four of TVA’s plants constituted a public nuisance and
ordered TVA to install or retrofit “scrubbers” at the four plants. This decision was appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, Inc. 42 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that plaintiffs could not sue polluters under the
federal common law of nuisance because Congress had adopted the Clean Air Act which
preempted federal common law. The Court held that EPA’s actions pursuant to the Act displace
any common law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel powered
power plants. However, the court did not decide whether the federal Clean Air Act preempted
state suits pursuant to state common law theories of nuisance, trespass, or other legal theories.
Courts are reluctant "to enjoin as a public nuisance activities which have been considered and
specifically authorized by the government." 43
“Private” Nuisances
Private nuisances are conceptually and legally similar to public nuisances except that private
nuisances involve private parties as defendants or as both plaintiffs and defendants. Such suits
differ in a number of other ways from “public nuisance” suits of the sort described above and
have greater likelihood of surviving legal challenges for several reasons. First, there is broad
precedent for successful private common law nuisance suits in flooding contexts in which private
landowners claim that governmental units have created a nuisance by failing to adequately
consider more traditional flood hazards in their activities and this has increased flood damages.
Second, private nuisance suits between governments and private landowners based upon
negligence or other common law theories are typically less nebulous than suits based upon
“public nuisance” discussed above and less susceptible to arguments that broad issues of public
policy are involved and these issues should be addressed in a legislative forum. Third, in most
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instances, failure to consider climate change will be only one additive factor in a flood or erosion
damage suit based upon state common law pertaining to flooding.
Negligence (“Unreasonable” Conduct)
Governments and, more broadly, both public and private landowners have long had a duty to
exercise "reasonable care" in their actions in order to avoid injury to others. See generally The
Law of Torts, 5th ed. (1984) at p. 169. 44 Unlike nuisance and trespass which involve damages to
land, negligence is broader and applies to many types of activities including but not limited to
damages to land.
Negligence results from the creation of an unreasonable risk of injury to others. In determining
whether a risk is unreasonable, both the seriousness and likelihood of the harm are relevant. The
standard of conduct is that of a "reasonable man" in the circumstances. In a negligence-based
flood liability suit, landowners need to show that governments have a duty to undertake or avoid
actions which increase flood damages; that increased flooding has occurred; that they have been
damaged; and that the damages have been caused by government action or inaction.
Negligence provides a broad basis for flood-related suits, potentially including climate-related
suits. It has become the primary legal theory upon which public liability for traditional flood
hazards has rested for inadequate construction and maintenance of hazard reduction measures
such as flood control structures, improperly prepared and issued warnings, inadequate processing
of permits, and inadequate inspections.
There have apparently been no successful negligence suits to date based upon the arguments that
governments are liable for damages for failing to take into account climate change in their flood
programs with resulting increases in flood damages beyond those naturally occurring. However,
successful suits seem quite possible in the future for the reasons set forth below.
A variety of factors are relevant to the "reasonableness" of government conduct in a specific
circumstance. Some of these include:
--The severity of the potential harm posed by a particular activity. Where severe
harm may result from an act or activity, a "reasonable man" must exercise great care. See
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose 45, in which the court stated “(t)hat the greater the risk, the
greater the amount of care required to avoid injury to others.” With an ultrahazardous activity,
the degree of care required may be so great that it approaches strict liability. For example, flash
flooding due to climate change will pose severe harm in some circumstances such as the failure
of a dam or overtopping of a levee.
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--Knowledge of the danger. A reasonable man is responsible for injuries or damages
which he or she knows or should know. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Bossier City 46 (City not liable for
small hole in area subject to city easement because city had no actual or constructive notice of
hole.). Courts often find negligence where a landowner is aware of a dangerous condition. It is
hard to imagine public employees or consultants working with flood-related programs with no
knowledge of climate change although they may not have highly specific knowledge with regard
to the severity of climate-related flooding at specific sites.
--Foreseeability of the harm. A "reasonable man" is responsible for injuries or damages
which are or could be reasonably foreseen. See Scully v. Middleton. 47 To constitute negligence,
the act must be one which a reasonably careful person would foresee posing an appreciable risk
of harm to others. The test is not only whether he or she did in fact foresee the harm but whether
he or she should have foreseen it, given all the circumstances. For example, the direct warning of
a dangerous condition such as the cell phone report from a driver on a public road that a bridge
has been washed out provides foreseeability with regard to the need for placement of barricades.
But, so may a flood map or other sources of information.
The foreseeability of natural hazards has been dramatically increased in the last two decades not
only by documentation of past events but through development of various prediction models for
floods, earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, and virtually all other hazards. Courts do not require
that events be specifically predictable (e.g., date, place) to be "foreseeable". It is enough that the
event could have been anticipated in a more general sense. For example, in Barr v. Game, Fish
and Parks, 48 the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected an "act of God" defense for flooding,
erosion and silt deposition damage caused by construction of a dam with an inadequate spillway
by the Colorado Game, Fish and Parks Commission. The court held that a "maximum probable
storm, by definition, is both maximum and probable”. The Court of Appeals agreed (Id., at 344)
with the lower court which had concluded:
(W)ith modern meteorological techniques, a maximum probable storm is predictable
and maximum probable flood is foreseeable. Thus being both predictable and
foreseeable to the defendant in the design and construction of the dam, the defense of
act of God is not available to them. In short, the flood which occurred in June of 1965
could not be classified as an act of God.
The court concluded that the dam should have been designed to meet the requirements of the
maximum probable flood—about 200,000 cubic feet per second at this point of the stream.
Trespass
At common law, landowners may also bring trespass actions for certain types of public and
private physical invasions of private property such as flooding or drainage. See e.g., Hadfield v.
Oakland County Drain Com'r. 49 There are several different types of "trespass". However, a
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discussion of the law of trespass is beyond the scope of this paper. Principal activities which may
be subject to trespass suits in climate-related contexts are similar to those which may be subject
to “nuisance suits. See above.
Violation of Riparian Rights
At common law, riparian landowners enjoy a variety of special rights incidental to the ownership
of riparian lands. These rights or "privileges" include fishing, swimming, and construction of
piers. Riparian rights must be exercised "reasonably" in relationship to the reciprocal riparian
rights of other riparian landowners. Courts have held that construction of levees, dams, etc. by
one government or private riparian landowner which increases flood damages on other riparian
lands are a violation of riparian rights. 50 Failure to reasonably take into account increases in
flooding due to climate change may also, arguably, constitute a violation of riparian rights.
The Law of Surface Waters
Under the rule of "reasonable use" (or some variation of it) for “surface” waters adopted by
courts in most states, landowners may not, at common law, block the flow of diffused surface
waters, substantially increase that flow, or channel that flow to a point other than the point of
natural discharge. Courts have usually applied the rule of reasonable use to governmental units
as well as private landowners. But there are some differences. For example, a Minnesota court
held that a community could not claim “reasonable use” as a defense to a “taking claim”. 51
Strict Liability
Courts, in most states, have held that landowners and governments are "strictly liable" for the
collapse of dams or levees because impoundment of water, following an early English ruling, has
often been considered an "ultra-hazardous" activity and subject to “strict” liability. Private and
public landowners are liable for damages from ultra-hazardous activities even when no
negligence is involved. Landowners damaged by climate change-related flooding and erosion
from the collapse of a dam or levee could argue that rules of strict liability apply to such
damages or, at a minimum, that failure to adequately anticipate such flooding is negligence.
Denial of Lateral Support
At common law, the owner of land has a duty to provide "lateral support" to adjacent lands and
any digging, trenching, grading, or other activity which removes naturally occurring lateral
support must be done at one's peril. Erosion caused by climate change in the construction or
maintenance of roads, bridges, buildings, and other public works may deny lateral support to
adjacent lands causing land failures (landslides, mudslides, erosion, and building collapse). 52
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Statutory Liability
Some states have adopted statutes which create separate statutory grounds for flood and erosionrelated law suits. For example, the Texas Water Code, article 7589a (Act of 1927) makes it
unlawful for any person to divert the natural flow of waters or to impound surface waters in a
manner that damages the property of others. 53 These statutes could, at least in part, form the
basis for law suits claiming that governments have exacerbated or failed to anticipate climaterelated flood damages.
Inverse Condemnation ("Taking" Without Payment of Just Compensation) Due to
Flooding of Private Lands
Landowners are not limited to common law legal theories in suing governments for increasing
flooding and erosion on their private lands. Courts increasingly hold governments liable for
direct physical interference with private lands due to flooding, mudflows, landslides, or other
physical interferences based upon a theory of "taking" of property without payment of just
compensation. See discussion below. For example, see Ingram v. City of Redondo Beach 54, in
which the court held that collapse of an earthen retaining wall maintained by the city with
resulting flooding was basis for an inverse condemnation suit. Inverse condemnation actions for
damage or destruction of private property due to increased natural hazards caused by government
activities have been recognized in many states. 55

CLIMATE CHANGE AND UNCOMPENSATED “TAKING” OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY
As discussed earlier, landowners in climate-related suits may not only sue governments for
increasing flooding and flood damages to their private property based upon various common law
legal theories but in some instances for tightly regulating private property without payment of
just compensation. The 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution and similar provisions
in state constitutions require that governments pay “just compensation” if they “take” private
property. Landowners may claim a taking in both regulatory and nonregulatory contexts. We will
briefly consider both contexts.
Increased Flooding and Erosion Damages as a Taking of Private Property in Non
Regulatory Contexts

As discussed above, governments may “take” private property by increasing flood or erosion
hazards and damages in a broad range of flood-related none regulatory contexts such as fill and
grading, construction of bridges, installation of culverts, construction of dams and levees, and
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construction of sea walls, groins and jetties. Increased flooding, erosion, mudslides, and
landslides may be expected with an increase in precipitation and the intensity and magnitude of
storms in some areas such as the Northeast and Southeast. As a result, what are now considered
once in 100 year storms will occur more frequently and the flood depths and velocities of floods
which do occur may exceed the design capacity of levees, dams, and stormwater systems. Winter
flooding may also be increased in the northern states as more winter precipitation occurs as rain
rather than snow. Landowners may argue that governments have acted unreasonably if
governments have failed to consider changed conditions in designing, constructing, maintaining
and operating flood control structures, issuing permits, or constructing or operating flood
warning systems.
Courts, with very limited exceptions, find a taking if private property is physically appropriated,
damaged, destroyed or otherwise physically used for public purposes. See, e.g., Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 56 An example of a physical taking in a flood context is
government construction of a dune on private property. See, for example, Lorio v. Sea Isle City
57
. However physical “taking” without compensation is rare because regulatory agencies usually
make no attempt to actually possess private lands. Where they do, landowners with flooding
increased by government actions have the option of suing governments under Constitutional
“taking” or tort theories.
See St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) cert denied sub nom; In Re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, No. 05-1119 L. May 1, 2015. In this case, the federal Court
of Claims held 58 the United States liable for flood damages from Hurricane Katrina caused by the
“gross negligence” of the Army Corps of Engineers in failing to adequately operate and maintain
the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet—a canal built to permit swift passage between the Port of New
Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. The Court of Claims awarded five plaintiffs $720,000 in
damages with a likely much larger ultimate payout to other plaintiffs. This suit may open the
door to many other suits claiming that governments “take” private property by failing to
adequately maintain infrastructure such as dams, dikes and levees.
Highly Restrictive Regulations as a Taking of Private Property in Regulatory Contexts
As discussed above, landowners subject to climate change-related floodplain regulations may
also sue governments for tightly regulating their lands. Landowners have succeeded in only a
few suits challenging the Constitutionality of flood plain regulations (none related to climate
change) and future challenges to climate-related floodplain regulations on taking grounds are
similarly likely to fail but governmental units need to be careful, particularly where regulations
prevent all economic use of lands. Over the last several decades, courts have broadly upheld
flood and erosion regulations based upon more traditional flooding and erosion against taking
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claims. It is likely they will likewise support amended regulations which incorporate climate
change.
For examples of cases supporting restrictive regulations for traditional flood or erosion areas see,
e.g., Gove v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatam 59 (Court held that zoning board’s denial of a
residential building permit for a parcel of land located within a coastal conservancy and flood
district subject to severe coastal flooding was not a taking because it did not deny the landowner
all economically beneficial use of land and did not deprive her of distinct investment backed
expectations.); McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council 60 (Court held that denial of permits
to backfill two lots and build bulkheads for an area considered “tidelands” was not a taking
because they were public trust property and subject to control by the state.); Spiegle v. Beach
Haven 61 (Court upheld, against challenge, building setbacks and fence ordinances for a coastal
area which had been badly damaged by the Ash Wednesday storm of March 1962 against claims
that the regulations were a taking of private property.); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 62
(Court upheld a beach zoning district which limited the beach to open space recreational uses
based, in part, upon potential for storm damage to structures if constructed in the beach area.);
Town of Indialantic v. McNulty63 (Court upheld setback line in part, to prevent future flood and
erosion damage from hurricanes.)
In deciding whether floodplain and other types of regulations are a regulatory taking, courts
apply four overall tests:
--First, they determine whether regulations physically appropriate private property. As
discussed above, courts typically hold that any physical appropriation is a taking. This is rarely
an issue with floodplain regulations because regulations do not physically appropriate property.
--Second, courts determine whether the regulations deny all “economic use” of lands.
“Denial of all economic use” is a common “bottom line” test for regulations. Landowners may
file a suit if regulations prevent all economic use of entire private properties and the proposed
activities lack nuisance or public safety considerations. See, e.g., Monsoldo v. State 64 (New
Jersey Supreme Court held that state floodway restrictions could be a taking of private property
if regulations deny all economic or productive use.). See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council (possible taking). 65
In deciding whether regulations deny all economic use of lands a court looks at the entire
property not simply a portion. This means that floodplain setbacks, dune lines, floodway areas
and other regulations tightly controlling only portions of properties are not held to be a taking if
economic uses remain for other portions. Courts also do not hold regulations to be a taking
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where the regulated area is owned by the state or is subject to “public trust” or subject to public
prescriptive easements. Courts do not hold regulations to be a taking if they prevent activities
which would not be permitted under state rules of nuisance and property. For example, a
regulation preventing development in coastal flood areas subject to sea level rise where such
development would increase flood heights on other lands would merely prohibit what would be
prohibited pursuant to state nuisance or trespass law. State common law and Constitutional
theories which may apply in such contexts are described above.
--Third, courts determine whether public interests outweigh private interests. If there is no
physical taking and there is no denial of all economic use, courts apply a third “Penn Central”
balancing test to determine whether a taking has occurred. 66 This test balances public and private
interests. The results in a specific circumstance depend upon a number of factors. Principle
factors include “(t)he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations…”
and the “character of the governmental action”. 67 As the Federal Court of Claims in Norman v.
U.S. 68 observed in applying this test: “The court must balance the liberty interest of the private
property owner against the government’s need to protect the public interest through the
imposition of the restraint.”
As far as the author could determine, no court has held that hazard regulations are a taking when
applying the Penn Central balancing of public and private interests test. Similar judicial support
for regulations adopted to prevent or reduce flood damages from climate change is likely. Courts
have broadly upheld restrictive floodplain regulations against Constitutional challenges to date,
as discussed below, and a similar result is likely for regulations reflecting climate change.
Courts have traditionally given great weight to public health and safety considerations in
sustaining regulations against Constitutional taking challenges. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty
Co., v. Saxl,69 in which the Court stated where public safety is involved, the legislature may take
the most “conservative course which science and engineering offer.” See also, Mugler v.
Kansas, 70 in which the Court rejected a taking challenge to laws prohibiting the production or
sale of intoxicating beverages.); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 71 in which the Court upheld
an ordinance which prohibited extraction of gravel below the groundwater level against taking
claim due, in part, to the possible safety hazards posed by such open water pits. This ordinance
effectively prevented any economic use of the land.
The Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 72 however raised the question to what
extent the goals of regulations and the relationship of the regulatory standard to these goals
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should be considered in deciding whether a taking has occurred. In interpreting Lingle, the
federal court of appeals in Rose Acre Farms v. U.S. 73 held that health and safety considerations
continue to be relevant to the “character of government action” in applying the Penn Central test
for taking. The court held that “(W)e do not believe Lingle caused any diminution in the
importance of Penn Central character prong, at least with respect to public health and safety
regulations.” 74 Such a position makes sense but will need further clarification in the courts.
--Fourth, courts determine whether regulations impose unconstitutional conditions. Courts
apply a fourth test for regulatory taking in circumstances in which imposition of an
unconstitutional condition upon issuance or denial of a regulatory permit is a taking. The
condition may involve an activity called for by a regulatory agency or the payment of a fee.
The U.S. Supreme Court has, over the last two decades, issued three decisions imposing quite
stringent requirements on government exactions as a condition to issuing regulatory permits or
subdivision approval, reasoning that “exactions” are analogous to physical taking. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission75 held that an attempt by the
California Coastal Commission to require a landowner to dedicate a public beach easement to the
state in order to receive a building permit was a taking. In a later case, Dolan v. City of Tigard,76
the Court held that city regulations for the 100 year floodplain which required a property owner
to donate a 15 foot bike path along the stream were a taking. The Court stated that the
municipality had to establish that the dedication/exaction conditions had to have an “essential
nexus” to the regulatory goals and “rough proportionality” in "nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.” In the third case, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District 77 the Court broadly endorsed the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests of
Nolan and Dolan and extended the application of these decisions to monetary exactions.
The decision poses new impediments for regulators. However, Justice Alito in the majority
opinion recognized that landowners may be made to internalize the negative externalities of their
conduct. He observed that “this is a hallmark of responsible land use policy and we have long
sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.” The Court also noted that “our
precedents thus enable permitting authorities to insist that applicants bear the full costs of their
proposals….” Under Nolan and Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit
applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development but it may not leverage
its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue government ends that lack an essential nexus and
rough proportionality to those impacts while still forbidding the government from engaging in
“out-and-out . . . extortion” that would thwart the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.”
What This Means to Climate-Related Floodplain Regulations
Given the strong judicial support for floodplain regulations to date, future legal challenges to
climate-related floodplain regulations on taking or other grounds will likely fail but
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governmental units need to be careful, particularly where such regulations could prevent all
economic use of land. In such circumstances governments need to document with particular care
offsite impacts of development. Recommendations for reducing potential liability are discussed
below. Governments need to document health or safety threats with the use of hazard lands.
They need to document access requirements during flood events. They need to document
potential threats to emergency workers in case of a hurricane or inland storm. In some
circumstances they may need to document “public trust” and government prescriptive rights for
lands subject to tight regulations.
To avoid “per se” taking arguments, governments may take a “performance standards” approach
to regulation. Governments need to coordinate real estate tax policies and regulations. In some
instances governments need to purchase flood damage prone properties and not rely solely on
regulations, particularly where active public use is desired.

WHY CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED SUITS MAY BE SUCCESSFUL
OVER TIME
As discussed above, no government has to date been successfully sued for damages for failing to
take into account climate change in its policies or activities. Suits face substantial hurdles such as
the sovereign immunity defense. Never the less successful suits seem quite possible over time for
several reasons:
--Flood, landslide, avalanche and other natural hazards including but not limited to
those caused or contributed to by climate change are becoming increasingly "foreseeable"
and “predictable”. The potential for successful suits based upon negligence, nuisance, trespass,
taking or other theories will increase as the techniques and capabilities for defining hazard areas
and predicting hazard events improve and become more quantitative. With improved,
quantitative predictive capability, hazard events become (to a greater or lesser extent)
"foreseeable". Failing to take such hazards into account with resulting increased flooding may,
under certain circumstances, constitute negligence, strict liability or a “taking”. 78
--Flood-related suits which are now quite common claiming that governments have
increased flood, erosion, and related hazards on private lands in traditional, nonclimate
change contexts may be expanded to include climate change-related flooding and erosion as
well. Climate change may be one of several causes of increased flood heights or velocities and
resulting damages in such suits.
--Advances are being made in the techniques available for reducing hazard losses
including those from climate change-related flooding. Advances (e.g.,computerized,
automated flood warning systems) create an increasingly high standard of care for “reasonable
conduct”. Governments, private landowners, architects, engineers and others are negligent if they
fail to exercise "reasonable care". As technology advances, the techniques and approaches which

78
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must be applied by engineers, architects and others for "reasonable conduct”, judged by the
practices applied by their profession in their region, also advance. Architects and engineers must
demonstrate a level of knowledge and expertise equal to that of architects and engineers in their
region. 79 Widespread dissemination of information concerning techniques for reducing flood and
erosion losses through magazines, technical journals, and reports, has also broadened the concept
of "region" so that it may be argued that a broad if not national standard of professional
reasonableness now exists.
--Advances are being made in natural hazard modeling techniques available to
establish causation, the reasonableness of conduct, and damages. Fifty years ago, it was very
difficult for a landowner to prove that a particular activity increased flooding, subsidence,
erosion, or other hazards on his or her land. This was particularly true when the increase was due
to multiple activities on many lands such as increased flooding due to development throughout a
watershed. Today, sophisticated modeling techniques facilitate proof of causation and allocation
of fault including cumulative impacts and this analytical and predictive capability will improve
and become more accurate over time. 80
--Courts are making it increasingly difficult to establish the defenses of “act of
God”, “contributory negligence” and “assumption of risk”. Traditionally, “act of God”
contributory negligence (i.e., actions which contribute to the injury or loss), and assumption of
risk were partial or total defenses to negligence. Today, many states have adopted comparative
negligence statutes which substitute comparative negligence for contributory negligence. Such
statutes permit recovery (based upon percentage of fault) even where the claimant has been
partially negligent. In a somewhat similar vein, courts have curtailed the "assumption of risk"
doctrine and have held, in some cases, that even an explicit assumption of risk is no defense
against a negligence law suit. 81

CONCLUDING REMARKS: STAYING OUT OF TROUBLE
Over time, climate-related natural hazards will be increasingly quantified, foreseeable and
predictable with improved computer models and global and regional monitoring. As this occurs,
governments may well be held liable for failing to anticipate flooding in areas which have not
previously flooded and/or for exacerbating existing flood problems. Governments need to be
particularly careful with their policies for areas behind dikes, dams, and levees where
catastrophic losses may occur if design frequencies are exceeded and the legal doctrine of “strict
liability” may apply.
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Human-induced climate change and the flood damages due to these changes will likely be with
us for a long time. To avoid or reduce potential litigation, governments could best approach
climate change proactively as suggested by the measures described below and in Box 1. They
should evaluate the impacts of climate change on their programs and upon private landowners.
They should take steps to reduce and compensate for impacts. Such actions would make sense
from public policy perspectives. And they would help governments meet claims that they have
acted negligently (“unreasonably”) in a specific instance.
Courts have broadly upheld tight floodplain regulations in more traditional contexts over the last
several decades and are likely to continue to do. Governments may adopt, with considerable
confidence, tightened floodplain and erosion area regulations incorporating climate change
projections. However, governments should approach regulation of private lands with particular
care where the regulations may deny landowners all economic use of entire parcels of private
land and the proposed uses lack public trust, nuisance, or public safety considerations. More
detailed and accurate flood data are desirable for such areas as well as documentation of
nuisance impacts and threats to safety.
Reduce Potential Government Liability for Failing to Consider Climate Change
To reduce potential liability for failure to consider climate change, governments could begin with
a look at potential impacts of climate changes on their governmental unit and the impact, in turn,
upon private lands. Such a look would support government arguments that they are responding
“reasonably” (nonnegligently) to climate change and help them avoid liability from more
traditional flooding as well. Other measures for reducing potential liability include:
•

Do not locate damage-prone government buildings such as post offices, roads, and
sewer and water lines in flood areas taking into account not only traditional flooding
but climate-change related flooding and erosion.

•

Map areas with climate change-related flooding or erosion; reflect these mapped hazard
areas in government policies and activities including flood regulatory maps.

•

Deny zoning, subdivision, and building code permits for residences and other structures
if proposed activities will increase hazards on other lands, anticipating climate change.

•

Relocate public and private flood prone structures outside of hazard areas taking into
account climate-change and related flood hazards. Relocation of flood damage-prone
development is particularly appropriate for long duration or permanent flooding such as
coastal flood areas affected by sea level rise.

•

Acquire properties subject to climate change flooding proactively and allocate them to
park, greenway and other government uses with low flood damage potential. Such
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acquisitions are often “low risk” and “no regret” options 82 because they would often make
sense whether or not projected climate changes occur. Acquisition of flood prone areas
could often simultaneously protect flood storage and protect wildlife, provide outdoor
recreation, prevent drainage problems, and reduce future flood losses.
•

Acquire flood easements where government activities will increase hazards taking into
account anticipated climate change. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has
broadly purchased flowage easements from private landowners where lands may be
periodically inundated by Corps dams and levees and other projects. Easement acquisition
could be more broadly extended to climate change flood areas.

•

Include disclaimers in maps, building permits and subdivision approvals pertaining to
potential climate-related flood damages. Regulatory agencies could require that permit
applicants agree to hold harmless governmental units if permitted buildings or activities are
subject to climate change-related and other natural hazards and damages. For example,
some states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin have adopted model floodplain ordinances
for use by local governments containing disclaimers pertaining to the accuracy of flood
maps and the magnitude of the regulatory flood. These disclaimers could be extended to
broader climate change-related flooding and erosion.

•

Encourage communities to enroll in FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program
including the Community Rating system if communities have not already done so.
Landowners who are compensated by flood insurance for their flood losses are, as a
practical matter, less likely to sue governments for climate-related and other types of
flooding.

•

Reduce climate-related flood hazards to or below naturally occurring levels through
structural and nonstructural loss reduction measures such as wetland and riparian area
restoration, flood warning systems, public acquisition of greenways, construction of dikes,
dams, levees, flood proofing and other approaches. In general, governments are only liable
for increasing flood hazards and damages, not for natural levels of flooding. However
construction of structural measures should be approached with particular care including
consideration of “residual risk” because flood control measures such as levees often
decrease flood hazards at one location and increase hazards at another or decrease for small
flood events but increase for large scale events where flood frequency engineering designs
are exceeded.
Reduce the Potential for Successful “Taking” Challenges to Restrictive Floodplain
Regulations

Governments can also take a variety of measures to reduce the potential for successful taking
challenges to regulations:
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•

To reduce the potential for successful “taking” challenges to highly restrictive
floodplain regulations governments may best apply a “performance standard”
approach. Courts have broadly upheld tight performance standard floodplain regulations
in more traditional contexts over the last several decades and are likely to continue to do so
for climate change caused or exacerbated flooding. However, governments should
approach regulation of private lands with particular care where the regulations may deny
landowners all economic use of entire parcels of private land and the uses proposed by
landowners lack public trust, nuisance, or public safety considerations. Such performance
standards include prohibition of activities which threaten the health and safety of floodplain
occupants and prohibition of activities which will increase flood heights or velocities on
adjacent lands.

•

If governments attach conditions to development permits such as flood proofing
requirements or preservation of floodway areas related to climate change,
governments should make sure that conditions are reasonable and reasonably related
to the impacts of the development on floodplain resources. They should be particularly
careful if dedications of land are required with the goal of providing public use of areas.

•

Governments should map high velocity, erosion, flash flooding and other high risk
areas posing particular threats to health and safety or increasing flood hazards on
other lands (e.g., floodways) to provide the basis for restrictive regulations.

•

Governments should identify areas where protection of the areas from development
may serve not only to reduce climate change-related flood losses and potential liability
but protect wetlands and other sensitive areas, protect and enhance water quality,
provide recreation, and serve other objectives. Acquisition and maintenance of such areas
as parks, greenways, and bike paths will often be “no regret” options because they can be
justified not only to reduce climate change-related flood losses and potential liability but to
serve a variety of other objectives.

•

Governments could adopt and implement a “no adverse impact” flood standard
reflecting climate change 83 as well as more traditional types of flooding. Application of a
nondiscriminatory overall no adverse impact standard in regulations and even-handed
administration and enforcement of such a standard could reduce the possibility of
successful due process or “taking” legal challenges of floodplain regulations.
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Box 1
Some Suggested Steps for Governments in Addressing Climate Change
Scientists broadly agree that climate changes due to human activities are occurring. There is less
agreement concerning the amounts of change, where the changes will occur, the impacts of
change on flooding and erosion, and what policies should be applied to particular activities at
specific locations in light of these changes.
What steps might governments take in formulating and implementing flood loss reduction efforts
reflecting climate change? Some suggestions include:
1. Take a careful look at potential climate change flood-related impacts. A first step already
taken by some units of government but needed by many others would be to take a careful look at
the impact of climate change on their government policies and programs and how these affect
“what happens on the ground”. For example, an agency designing and building flood control
structures for a coastal area could calculate and map the impacts of sea level rise on public and
private development. Such analyses may, then, provide the basis for developing and selecting
among management alternatives such as elevation of structures versus adoption of setbacks.
Taking a “hard look” is consistent with NEPA and “baby NEPA” environmental impact
requirements at the federal, state, and local levels. It is consistent with requirements that
governments act “reasonably” to avoid common law claims of negligence.
Many governments are taking a “wait and see” position and are making no or little effort to
factor climate change into their programs including design of levees, dams, groins, sea walls,
channels, stormwater systems and other flood reduction measures, flood plain regulations,
evacuation plans, etc. This position may be justified where preliminary estimates of climate
change suggest there will be no or little increase or decrease in precipitation, sea level, or other
climate change impacts. But (arguably) this position is not justified and may be considered
“unreasonable” from a negligence perspective where there will be large projected climate-related
flooding with severe damages such as permanent flooding of an area from sea level rise or
overtopping of a levee with loss of life. No action may be unreasonable where the costs of
measures to anticipate and reduce the flood-related impacts of climate change are relatively low
such as adding multiobjective freeboard in flood protection elevations. Such freeboard may also,
in many instances, be based in part upon residual risks from more traditional causes of flooding
and erosion (possible levee collapse), watershed urbanization, wave run-up and other factors.
2. Undertake more detailed assessments of flood and flood damage potential as needed. A
second step, building upon the first step, would be for governments to take a more detailed look
at climate change and climate change damages at sites where a hard look (above) suggests there
may be serious problems. This approach may involve more detailed, computer analysis of
projected changes in flood elevations and velocities combined with scenario analysis to evaluate
the potential impact of specific climate changes on specific activities at particular sites such as
the flood damage potential of areas and activities subject to sea level rise.
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3. Identify management options including “low risk” and “no regret” scenarios such as
wetland, riparian and floodplain restoration (where applicable). Having evaluated potential
impacts and damages and taking into account other relevant factors, a government body is then
in a position to decide what would be reasonable sea level rise and flooding options for particular
activities in particular areas such as added flood freeboard and added set back lines on a barrier
island. These will often include “low risk and “no regret” multiobjective policies such as
establishment of building setbacks and greenways and establishment of green infrastructure such
as multiobjective stormwater management measures. A wide variety of “low risk” and “no
regret” management options may make sense (depending upon the context), where the
magnitude of climate change and resulting flooding and erosion impacts are quite certain.
Policies need to reflect not only the severity of hazard but the vulnerability of activities to flood
and erosion damage. For example, critical facilities such as nuclear power plants should be
prohibited where there is any danger from flooding or erosion. The melt-downs of three nuclear
reactors in Fukushima, Japan caused by a massive tsunami in 2011 are clear examples of the risk
associated with siting sensitive and/or hazardous infrastructure and facilities in areas with
projected climate change flooding.
4. Implement management options including policies for both public and private lands. A
fourth step would be to integrate this assessment information into broader, multiobjective land
and water management, watershed management, and floodplain management efforts including
local comprehensive planning. For example, the acquisition of riverine greenways may
simultaneously reduce nonclimate change induced flooding from watershed development,
climate changed induced flooding from increased precipitation, and potential law suits based
upon flood damages from both nonclimate change induced and climate change induced flooding.
It may also reduce water pollution, protect fish and wildlife, and provide public recreational
opportunities. Multiobjective floodplain acquisition programs are often both “low risk” and “no
regret” because they may be economically and ecologically justified whether or not climate
change occurs. Another example of “low risk” and “no regret” measure is adding freeboard to
flood protection elevations for levees, houses, and subdivisions to reduce flood damage from
watershed development as well as to address climate change.
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APPENDIX B: OTHER LEGAL CHALLENGES
As discussed above, governments may be sued for failing to consider climate change in their
government activities based upon a variety of legal theories already discussed. The remedy
sought by many plaintiffs is damages. Governments may also be sued pursuant to a number of
other legal theories such as those below which, if successful, could compel governments to
consider climate change in their decision-making but would not necessarily involve award of
monetary damages.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Litigation
Plaintiffs in several cases have successfully argued that federal agencies or states have failed to
take a sufficiently careful look at the environmental impacts of their contributions to climate
change pursuant to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
state “baby” NEPA’s. See, for example, the Center for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin. 84 in which the court held that the agency’s environmental impact
statement was inadequate and ordered the agency to revise their impact statement.:
Thus, the fact that "climate change is largely a global phenomenon that includes actions
that are outside of [the agency's] control . . . does not release the agency from the duty of
assessing the effects of its actions on global warming within the context of other actions
that also affect global warming." States' Gray Br. at 15 (emphasis added). The cumulative
impacts regulation specifically provides that the agency must assess the "impact of the
action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions
regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other
actions." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; see also Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1306
(9th Cir. 1994)
As noted above, these suits have not been for damages.
Endangered Species Litigation
This category of litigation involves claims by environmental organizations and government
agencies that the Department of Interior and/or other agencies are failing to adequately protect
endangered species or potentially endangered species from climate change. Courts in some cases
have held that federal agencies have inadequately evaluated the impacts of climate change on
specific species. 85 For example, in Natural Resources Council v. Kempthorne, 86 a federal district
court held that a 2005 biological opinion “no jeopardy finding” for Delta Smelt pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law because the agencies
failed to take into account climate change. See also South Yuba River Citizens League v.
NMFS. 87 (Biological Opinion inadequate pertaining to the endangered Chinook salmon, the
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distinct population segment of Central Valley steelhead ("steelhead"), and the southern distinct
population segment of North American green sturgeon.)
Claims that Governments Are Failing to Protect the Public Trust By Inadequately
Regulating Omissions of Greenhouse Gases
Our Children’s Trust in cooperation with other organizations has filed suits in a number of states
claiming that polluters causing climate change have failed to protect the public trust. None of
these suits have gone to trial but a Texas suit has survived preliminary legal challenges. The suit
sought judicial declaration that states have a duty to future generations with regard to an
“atmospheric trust”. 88
Clean Air Litigation
In these cases, governments, environmental not for profits and others have sued industries
claiming that they have released atmospheric gases which, in turn, have increased global
temperatures and produced various types of flood and erosion damages. 89 Plaintiffs have claimed
that polluters should be held liable under the Clean Air Act for damages caused by climate
change. Plaintiffs have also argued that EPA must adopt regulations regulating the emissions of
carbon. Although none of these suits for damages have succeeded, the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA (S. Ct., 2007) 90 held that the Clean Air Act authorizes federal regulation
of emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had misread that Act when it denied a rulemaking petition seeking
controls on greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. EPA is now drafting such
regulations. On August 3, 2015, the EPA issued the Clean Power Plan, which put the nation on
track to cut harmful pollution from the power sector by 32 percent below 2005 levels, while also
cutting smog-and soot-forming emissions that threaten public health by 20 percent.
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APPENDIX C: DEFENSES TO CLIMATE-RELATED HAZARD
LITIGATION
Agencies have a number of defenses to hazard-related litigation where landowners argue that
governments have failed to consider climate change in their policies or activities and damage has
resulted. Some major defenses include the following:
--The plaintiff does not have “standing” to bring suit. 91 This has been a commonly
pleaded defense in climate change-related litigation to date. Defendants have successfully argued
in some cases that climate change is a global issue and does not support “standing.” 92 However,
landowners damaged by increased flooding and erosion caused by failing to take into account
climate change will (arguably) be able to show the sorts of particularized damages necessary for
establishing standing. See, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA 93in
which the Court concluded that Massachusetts had standing to challenge EPA’s failure to
regulate greenhouse gases pursuant to the Clean Air Act based, in part, upon the state’s
ownership of land which would be damaged by rising sea levels.
A landowner damaged by failure to take into account climate change would not need to show
that a defendant’s actions where the sole cause of injury but rather one which “contributes to” the
kinds of injuries alleged by plaintiff.”
--Global warming is a “political question”. Another defense raised in climate-related
cases to date is that global warming is a “political” question and government climate changerelated policies should be decided by Congress or federal agencies (e.g., EPA) rather than the
courts. See, for example, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corporation 94. The court
in this case observed that “…the political question doctrine is a species of the separation of
powers doctrine and provides that certain questions are political as opposed to legal, and thus,
must be resolved by the political branches rather than by the judiciary.”
Some global warming issues are clearly political in nature such as Congressional appropriation
of funds for beach nourishment to address sea level rise and loss of dunes. However a suit based
upon nuisance, negligence, or other state common law cause of action or a suit based upon
inverse condemnation would be based upon well-established landowner property law rights and
duties rather than a broad political question. The U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit in a climate
change-related case, Comer v. Murphy Oil, 95 summarized court decisions applying to the
“political question” in the following useful manner (Id. at 873, 874, case citations omitted):
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Common-law tort claims are rarely thought to present nonjusticiable political questions.
Three Circuits have stated, in the political question context, that "the common law of tort
provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court can easily rely….”
The Fifth Circuit has similarly observed that, "when faced with an 'ordinary tort suit,' the
textual commitment factor actually weighs in favor of resolution by the judiciary." And
the Tenth Circuit, in a case governed by state negligence law, stated that "the political
question theory . . . do[es] not ordinarily prevent individual tort recoveries." …Claims for
damages are also considerably less likely to present nonjusticiable political questions,
compared with claims for injunctive relief. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit …categorically
stated that "monetary damages . . . do not . . . constitute a form of relief that is not
judicially manageable….”
--Governments have no affirmative duty to remedy naturally occurring hazards.
Courts have, in traditional flood contexts, held that, absent a statutory or other duty, landowners
and governments have no affirmative duty to remedy naturally occurring hazards on private or
public lands as long as they do not increase such hazards 96. This includes no duty to adopt
regulations or to construct hazard reduction structures such as dams. Courts have also held that
landowners and governments ordinarily have no duty to warn visitors, invitees, trespassers, or
members of the general public for naturally occurring hazards on public lands not exacerbated or
created by governments. However, there are exceptions to this general rule of no affirmative duty
and a gradual trend in the courts to broaden the exceptions. 97 For example, some governmental
units may be directly or indirectly required by specific statutes or regulations to consider climate
change in their actions and failure to do so may, at the minimum, be evidence of negligence. For
example, the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 98 has issued guidelines requiring companies
to evaluate climate change impacts. This might be interpreted as creating a duty to do so. In
addition it can be argued that climate change-related flooding is not “naturally occurring”
and increases natural levels of flood and erosion hazard.
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But, courts have also held that once a governmental unit elects to undertake government
activities, even where no affirmative duty exists for such action, it must exercise reasonable care.
See, e.g., Indian Towing v. United States. 99 This is often referred to as the "Good Samaritan"
rule. Although a public entity or private individual ordinarily has no duty to provide aid to an
individual in distress not caused by the public entity or private individual, once a governmental
unit (or a private individual) provides aid, it must do so with ordinary care.
--Preemption. A preemption defense involves a claim that federal authority bars
(preempts) state regulation such as state regulation of gases which cause climate change. See
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company, Inc. above. For cases holding that the Clean
Air Act preempts state nuisance claims see, e.g., U.S. v. Eme Homer City Generation; 100 North
Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 101
--There has been inadequate proof of causation. Governments may be able to defend
themselves in some climate-related flood cases by arguing that landowners have not provided
adequate proof or causation between the government acts and increased flood problems. The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that government acts were the cause of the alleged damages.
Proof of causation is a factual issue and one not easily met when there are many possible causes
for increasing flood damages. See, e.g., Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corporation 102.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Massachusetts v. EPA 103 that the impacts of
climate change, while “widely shared”, did not minimize the state of Massachusetts’s interest in
the outcome of the litigation and the state had standing to challenge the failure of EPA to adopt
regulations for greenhouse gases. The Supreme Court in this case recognized the causal
relationship between global warming and damages. Recognition by the Supreme Court of this
causal relationship should help plaintiffs in future suits establish the relationship between global
warming and a variety of damages in more specific contexts. As a California court observed in a
landslide case, a public entity may be liable for natural-hazard related injuries "even if its project
was only one of several ‘substantial’ concurring causes of damage." 104
In some instances, particularly where an ultrahazardous activity such as a dam has caused the
damage, the plaintiff may be aided by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor (the event speaks for
itself). See Annot., Res Ipsa Loquitor as Applicable in Actions for Damage to Property by the
Overflow or Escape of Water, 61 A.L.R.3d 186 (1975) also 11 A.L.R.2d 1179 (1950). Short of
strict liability, a North Carolina court in Bowling v. City of Oxford 105 held that evidence that the
city knew of a leak in a water supply dam created a prima facie case of negligence. This,
however, did not relieve the injured party from the burden of proving negligence. The court held
that res ipsa merely makes a "prima facie case of injury by negligence so as to place upon the
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defendant the burden of going forward with evidence to explain the occurrence." 106 However,
some courts have refused to apply the res ipsa loquitor presumption to flooding because the
landowner did not have “exclusive control” over the instrumentalities (the flooding) that caused
an injury. 107
--Government actions are “reasonable”. To defend themselves from an allegation of
negligence (“unreasonable action”) governments can argue that their actions or inactions are, in
fact, reasonable taking into account the standard of conduct in the community, severity of the
harm posed, foreseeability of harm and other factors. As discussed above, the standard of
conduct is that of a "reasonable man" in the circumstances.
--The decision to address or not to address climate change in flood calculations is
“discretionary” and, therefore, not subject to a negligence claim because such a decision
involves a variety of assumptions and policy issues. The Federal Tort Claims Act allows under
some circumstances private individuals to sue federal agencies for “negligence” or
“wrongful” acts 108. However, the Act contains a number of exceptions including “any
claim…based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government
whether or not the discretion involved be abused….” 109 A discretionary act defense is also often
available to local governments and state governments under state common law or state tort claim
acts in many states.
Unfortunately, the Federal Tort Claims Act does not define "discretionary” function or duty and
this has resulted in a good deal of litigation. As a practical matter, almost all government
decisions involve some measure of discretion. Large scale policy decisions are clearly
discretionary such as a legislative decision whether or not to construct a major interstate
highway. But nitty-gritty decisions also involve discretion such as a decision to repair a road on
one particular day rather than another, the repair materials to be used, and who will carry out the
task.
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 110 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify
(somewhat) the discretionary versus operational distinction. The Court allowed to go forward a
law suit for damage to a barge and its cargo when a tug pulling the barge ran aground due to the
Coast Guard's negligence in failing to properly operate a lighthouse. The Court held that the
decision to operate a lighthouse at that location was a discretionary function but that actual
operation was subject to a negligence suit. The Court observed that "one who undertakes to warn
the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'Good Samaritan' task in a
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careful manner." Id. at 64. In the lower federal courts, the 5th Circuit court in Greer v. United
States, 111 similarly held that the Coast Guard had discretion with regard to whether it provided a
navigational buoy but failure to correct the dislocation of a buoy despite warnings that it had
moved from its charted position was negligence since the Coast Guard had charted the location
of the buoy and boaters relied on the charted location.
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been asked a number of times to decide if
weather forecasts are the exercise of a discretionary function. The courts have consistently held
that forecasts are, in themselves, discretionary. See, e.g., National Manufacturing Co. v. United
States, 112 (National Weather Bureau could not be sued for disseminating erroneous flood and
weather information due, in part, to discretionary nature of forecasts.); Brown v. United
States, 113 (N.O.A.A. could not be sued for failure to predict a hurricane due in part to inoperable
weather buoy. However, in Pierce v. United States, 114 the 6th Circuit held that "(s)ince the FAA
has undertaken to advise requesting pilots of weather conditions, thus engendering reliance...it is
under a duty to see that information which it furnishes is accurate and complete."
For flood-related cases applying the discretionary function exception see, e.g., Vaizburd v.
United States, 115 (Court held that Corps had used discretion in design, planning and
implementation of a flood control project to reduce storm damage and protect a shoreline and
was therefore not liable for negligence.); United States v. Ure, 116 (Court held that flooding of
property due to burst of irrigation canal caused by the use of weaker materials was
discretionary.); Valley Cattle Co. v. United States, 117 (Court held that federal government was
not negligent and liable for flood damage caused by flood preparations for a “two year storm”
because this planning was discretionary.)
--Flooding and flood damages are subject to the flood exemption contained in the
Flood Control Act of 1936. Federal agencies may be able to defend themselves in the
construction and operation of flood control facilities affected by climate change by pleading not
only the “discretionary” section of the federal Tort Claims Act but section 702c of the Federal
Flood Control Act of 1936 (33 U.S.C. 702c (1986)). This important statutory exception to
liability may be held to apply to some types of climate change-related flood damages caused by
federal agencies. It provides, more specifically that “(n)o liability of any kind shall attach to or
rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.” Id.
See Central Green Co. v. United States. 118
Federal courts have, in some instances, gone so far as to characterize federal flood forecasts and
even federal floodplain mapping as "flood control" and therefore not subject to tort actions for
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negligence. See, e.g., Britt v. United States 119 (Court held that property owners had no claim of
negligence against the U.S. for preparing and disseminating inaccurate flood maps due to “flood
control” exemption in Federal Tort Claims Act.); Fortner v. Tennessee Valley Authority120
(Flood warnings related to operation of dams for flood control subject to immunity.).
The outer limits of the flood control exemption are being tested in the suits filed by individuals
damaged by Hurricane Katrina. See Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation 121 in
which the Court of Appeals at first held, citing Central Green, supra, that the 702c exemption
did apply to levees around the London Avenue Canal. But, the Court of Claims held that it did
not apply. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches; 122 St. Bernard Parish v. United States, No. 05-1119
L. May 1, 2015. 123
--Flooding was an “Act of God”. Governments in more traditional flooding cases have
often attempted to defend themselves by arguing that a specific flood event was an “act of God”
although it is increasingly difficult to establish the elements of an act of God defense for reasons
discussed below. Since the 16th century, "Act of God" has been recognized by courts as a
common law defense to negligence, nuisance, and trespass. It has also be recognized as a defense
in some contract cases (depending upon the language and terms of the contract) and as a defense
in some physical “takings” cases. In addition, it is a defense in some statutory liability contexts
such as liability for oil spills.
The "Act of God" defense is based upon the belief that one should not be held responsible for
what cannot be reasonably anticipated or guarded against. It is a defense that must be
affirmatively pleaded and proven by the defendant. It is a defense which was at one time much
more broadly allowed by the courts. Today the defense is, most often, narrowly construed. See,
e.g., Sabine Towing and Transp. Co. Inc., v. U.S. 124 in which the court held that spring runoff
was not an "act of God" which would excuse an oil spill.
The cases dealing with "Act of God" defense focus on two important hazard issues common to
hazard-related cases in general and often litigated: the foreseeability of various hazard events,
and the magnitude of the events.
To prove "Act of God", the defendant must establish to the satisfaction of the jury or court
(issues of fact) that 1) the event falls within the legal definition of "Act of God" and that 2) the
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"Act of God" and not the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the damage.
To prove that an event falls within the legal definition of "Act of God", courts have held that the
defendant must more specifically prove that:
--the event is an act of nature (hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, floods), not man,
--the event is unprecedented or at least very large scale,
--the event and resulting damage could not reasonably have been "anticipated" or
prevented, and
--the event was the proximate cause of the damage or injury.
Compliance with these requirements which may be stated as questions is proving increasingly
difficult:
--Was the event an act of nature? An "Act of God" is "due directly and exclusively to
natural causes without human intervention...." See Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Henry Carlson
Co., 125 It “excludes the idea of a human agency and where the cause considered is found to be in
part the result of the participation of man.…(T)he whole occurrence is thereby humanized,…and
removed from the operation of the rules applicable to the acts of God.” See Dempsey v. City of
Souris 126 (Discharge of untreated sewage from city sewage lagoon due in part to excessive
rainfall was not an “Act of God.”)
Although meteorological events (hurricanes, storms, tornadoes, lightning) continue to occur as
they have throughout history, most often the actual cause of damage is no longer totally natural
as in the case of climate change. A court could disallow an “Act of God” defense for climate
change-exacerbated flood hazards because of the element of human intervention.
--Was the event "unprecedented" or at least very large in magnitude? Some courts
have required that a flood event be "unprecedented" to qualify for an Act of God defense. A
climate change-related flood event may or may not be unprecedented depending upon the
specific facts. However, there would often be some warning based upon climate-related and
broader precipitation models and this would undermine the Act of God defense. For example, the
Alabama Supreme Court in Bradford v. Stanley 127 observed that: "In its legal sense an "Act of
God" applies only to events in nature so extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and
other conditions in the particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them."
--Was the event unforeseeable? The foreseeability of natural hazard events has been
dramatically increased in the last two decades not only by documentation of past events but
through various prediction and modeling techniques. Courts do not require that events be
specifically predictable (e.g., date, place) to be "foreseeable". It is enough that the event could
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have been anticipated in a more general sense. Mounting empirical and modeling evidence
makes climate change increasingly “foreseeable”.
--Was the event the proximate cause of the damage or injury? Proving that climate
change is the proximate cause of flood or erosion damage may be difficult, particularly where
flooding is due to some combination of traditional flooding and that which is caused by climate
change. The general rule is that when the natural event combines with the acts of the defendant
to produce the injury, the defendant is liable if the natural hazard event would not have
independently produced the damage without the defendant's acts. See e.g., Fairbrother v. Wiley's,
Inc. 128 (Gusty winds were not an “Act of God” and did not relieve defendant of fault for
negligence.) In Mark Downs, Inc. v. McCormick Properties, Inc., 129 the court noted that "An
"Act of God" will excuse mortal man from responsibility only if God is the sole cause....Where
God and man collaborate in causing flood damage, man must pay at least for his share of the
blame." Where the acts of man and the Acts of God combine to cause damage, courts have
generally held man responsible for the total damage. See e.g., National Weeklies, Inc. v.
Jensen 130 in which the court stated:
If the damage done was solely the result of an Act of God, the city was not liable. If
the negligence of the city proximately contributing and an Act of God combined to
produce the result, the city is liable.
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